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Indian Depredations along Texas's Rio Grande and
Trans-Pecos Frontiers, 1877-1882
RHETORIC AND REALITY

Steven M. Karr

I

n the late spring of 1877, near Eagle Pass, Texas, directly adjacent to the
U.S.-Mexico border and approximately 143 miles southwest of San Antonio, local children reportedly found a skull, which was promptly brought to
an area physician. His analysis determined that it was human-specifically
Comanche Indian. According to the San Antonio Express, the physician
based his conclusion on what he considered to be the skull's rather peculiar
characteristics. On 17 June 1877 the newspaper printed:
Evidently, the tribe of the Indians to which this warrior belonged are
very savage, as the absence of molars, the prominence and number of
incisors and the great strength of the bone, are points more natural to
beastly than human constitution.... The savage tribe of which this
Indian was a member was not intended by the Creator to ever take any
very prominent position among civilized nations of the Earth, and
would seem to destroy the idea humanitarians affect to court-that we
should tame the savage red man, rather than seek his extermination. l
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Such accounts were not uncommon in many southwest Texas newspapers during the 1870s; alarming reports ofIndian raids were published nearly
every day in several newspapers. In fact, Indian raids along the Trans-Pecos
and the Rio Grande frontiers were frequent occurrences until 1877.2 In response to those depredations the U.S. Army conducted three major military
campaigns into Mexico between 1873 and 1878, attacking Kickapoo and
Lipan Apache camps believed to be responsible for cross-border raids in
Texas. The military action proved effective, drastically reducing official reports of Indian depredations throughout this frontier region. J
Editors of some Texas newspapers, however, particularly those closest to
the U.S.-Mexico border, called for military support well after the army campaign in 1877. They printed stories exaggerating the Indian threat that were
loosely based on supposition, rumor, and outright fabrication and contrary
to available evidence. 4 Yet, the perception that Indians throughout much of
the American West were waging a campaign of wanton terror and violencefrom sanctuaries south of the Rio Grande where often both Mexican civilians and government officials eagerly collaborated in their efforts - was widely
regarded as true among Texans. 5To this point, military historian Robert
Wooster states, "Historians, with the advantage of hindsight, now know that
the defeat of the Plains tribes in the mid-1870s was decisive in Indian-army
confrontations. Subsequent Nez Perce, Bannock, Ute, Apache, and Sioux
struggles against the awesome strength of the United States seem to the
modern observer even more futile than earlier efforts to retain tribal freedom. Yet such conclusions were rarely evident to contemporary Americans,
who read only of recurring battles with Indians."6 Still, American Indians
were not always responsible for all depredations, and, with the exception of
isolated attacks originating from the Arizona and New Mexico Territories,
Indian depredations along the southwest Texas frontier had declined significantly by the mid-1870s.7
In 1877 a congressional military committee solicited information concerning the U.S.-Mexico border region from the secretary of war, numerous army officials, and civilians who lived along the frontier. Diplomatic
historian J. Fred Rippy notes that the committee "did not hesitate to ask
embarrassing questions" in relation to alleged Indian depredations along
the Rio Grande: "Who were the raiders on the southwestern frontier? Were
not some of them Texans? Why did not the United States army apprehend
them before they crossed into Mexico? What was Texas doing to repress the
disorders? Were the Texans not anxious for federal military posts simply to

SPRING 2004

give markets for their produce?" Rippy recognizes that these were important questions but he gives them no further consideration. s Clearly, the hue
and cry over Indian depredations along this frontier region was widely exaggerated during the period 1877-1882. The outrage was spurred, in part, by
growing demands for quick and orderly economic development and decades of Anglo American racial and ethnic stereotypes of both American
Indians and Mexicans. In light of these factors, this case study attempts to
provide not only a more balanced account of Indian depredations throughout Texas's Rio Grande and Trans-Pecos frontiers, but to explain what may
have prompted the false rhetoric that justified a strong United States military presence along much of the Texas-Mexico frontier.
The day after the San Antonio Express ran the story about the finding of
an Indian skull, another article announced, "Troops that started from Fort
Clark [Texas] some days since, struck a fresh trail made by raiders, supposed
to be Mexican Indians."9 In addition to such inciting news reports, the paper's
riling editorials continually hammered at its largely impressionable, if not
agreeable, readership. Newspapers launched an accusatory barrage against
the U.S. government for its perceived failure to support their state: "The
State of Texas [has] already expended a million and a half dollars in protecting her Rio Grande and Indian frontier,and it [is] time for the Federal
government to aid the state."10 The editor's object was to promote further
aggression against the alleged Indian threat and, more importantly;to increase the flow of federal dollars into the region.
Although Indians unquestionably engaged in hostile forays along much
of this frontier region, Texas was hardly the sole victim of these depredations. Roaming Indian bands also assaulted settlements in Mexico, and not
all ofthese raids originated in Mexico. Contrary to what many Texans claimed
and Americans believed, Mexican settlements along the Rio Grande actually bore the brunt of Indian and outlaw attacks by the late 1870s.
Many, if not most, Indian incursions in this region originated in the United
States and were sometimes launched from federal Indian reservations. However, not all raiders were Indian. A significant number of Anglo American,
Mexican American, and Mexican outlaws and thieves roamed the borderlands, preying on isolated homesteads, cattle herds, stagecoaches, and small
settlements. Despite Euroamerican brigandage, Indian bands crossed Texas'
Rio Grande and Trans-Pecos regions, often wreaking greater havoc than
Mexican or American outlaws. 1I Many Plains Indian cultures, including the
Comanches, were dominated by a martial or warrior social organization

192

~ NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 79, NUMBER 2

geared toward military raiding and warfare, which, although in decline by
this period, remained an important element of tribal culture. IZ The Lipans,
although often aiding the U.S. Army against the Comanches, their traditional enemy, suffered from Anglo and Mexican retaliation for the depredations launched by their own hostile bands, which would fight and raid their
enemies at any opportunity for gainY Other Apachean groups in the TexasMexico border region drew a clear distinction between raiding and warfare,
yet viewed the former, particularly against Anglo Americans, Mexicans, and
non-Apache Indians, as a legitimate and necessary part of their traditional
economy.14
After the Military Reconstruction of 1870 officially ended in Texas, public officials and opinion along the western frontier shifted focus to Indian
raids and other problems with Mexico along the international border. In
most parts of the South, federal troops were merely an occupying army to
most Whites, but many Texas citizens changed their view of these soldiers,
now essential allies in the fight to rid the frontier ofIndians and spur further
economic development.'5 Since before statehood in 1845, Texans labeled
the indigenous population a physical impediment to the progress of Anglo
civilization. They also believed that this obstacle was largely the product of
Mexico's inability to subdue and manage hostile Native groups inhabiting
its side of the border. 16 After the Civil War, growth in both the homesteader
population and the cattle industry pushed Anglo settlement and occupation onto lands that American Indians traditionally occupied. Texans, like
most Americans, understood little and cared less about Indian customs or
life-ways, and only grudgingly acknowledged sharing any cultural traditions
with Mexicans on either side of the Rio Grande. 17
During the late 1870s, several Texas newspapers called for even greater
federal military support to control allegedly hostile Indians. They also insisted that Indians living in Mexico disrupted homesteads, mail service, cattle
ranches, and the fledgling railroad industry on the north side of the border.
If such incidents indeed occurred, Texas newspapers overstated their destruction; from 1878 onward, Indians on federal reservations within the United
States were primarily responsible for depredations on both Texas and Mexican soil.
Since Spanish times, conflict marked the interaction between Whites
and Indians throughout much ofTexas and the southern Plains when Kiowas,
Comanches, and Apaches freely raided its settlement. When Texas joined
the United States in 1845, Indian attacks remained a serious concern,which
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the frontier psyche did not easily shed. The onset of the Mexican-American
War in 1846 and the California Gold Rush in 1849, brought thousands more
Whites who either traveled directly through or settled on traditional Indian
lands. In 1853, under the Treaty of Fort Atkinson, Comanches, Kiowas, and
Plains Apaches agreed to territorial limitations and annuities, and promised
not to molest White travelers along the Santa Fe Trail. The treaty also prohibited Indians from raiding in Mexico. However, intertribal warfare and
raids on Whites in Texas and Mexico continued. ls
The Union retreat from Texas in spring 1861 left much of the state and
the southern plains open to raids by Native tribes. Emboldened Indian warriors raided from both Mexico and the Plains, forcing many Texans to flee
the frontier or remain under precarious circumstances. At the Civil War's
conclusion the army reoccupied some previously vacated forts and established new ones. Yet the five-hundred-mile line of outposts stretching from
the Red River to the Rio Grande proved too porous to stem completely the
flow of Indians raiding on both sides of the international border. Despite
establishment of reservations among southern Plains tribes by the 1870S,
hostilities between Indians and Whites in Texas continued, culminating in
the Red River War from 1874-1875. While the Kiowas and Comanches retreated to reservation life in Indian Territory, troubles with Kickapoos, Lipans,
and Mescalero Apaches continued in southwest Texas and along the Mexican border. Any Indian threat from sanctuaries in Mexico, however, ended
with a total of six cross-border campaigns against the Kickapoos and Lipans
in 1873 and from 1876-1878. With the exception of a few minor skirmishes
in subsequent years, the Indian wars in Texas effectively ended in 1880 after
Col. Benjamin Grierson conducted his defensive campaign in the TransPecos region against remnants ofVictorio's Apache band. '9
Although Victorio and his warriors were content to raid in their homeland of southwestern New Mexico during late summer and fall 1879, a San
Antonio Express headline taken from an Eagle Pass telegraph report and
run on 7 September 1879 claimed that area citizens repelled raiding "red
skins." The Apaches then returned to their mountain homes across the Rio
Grande; the report's headline read "Indians Commit their Usual Depredations."2o The previous day the same newspaper reported Indian forays against
Mexican haciendas west of the Rio Grande. The release noted, "These [were]
the same Indians that have in previous years done such bloody work on this
side of the border."21 What was left unclear, however, was from where these
Indians originated. News editors printed scarcely credible reports, using
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rhetoric bordering on hysteria. It was not unusual for frontier publishers to
employ sensationalism; stories about Indian raids helped sell newspapers. 22
Addressing these "usual depredations," a San Antonio Express editorial stated:
The whoop of the painted savage sounds on the midnight air, and the
scalp of the white man dangles from his belt. Frightful depredations
and bloodshed [are] committed by Apaches and Mescaleros, men and
women murdered and their bodies outraged in a manner too horrible
to relate. [There is an] insufficiency of u.s. troops to protect the
almost defenseless people, and the citizens are rallying with arms to
protect themselves. 23
Editors were touchy over accusations that their newspapers sensationalized reports about Indian depredations. The San Antonio Express, the town's
largest news daily, acknowledged that it often received conflicting statements
but stated that it aspired "to give the latest and most authentic news, and it
has to rely entirely upon the citizens and the military for its reports."24 The
editor did not doubt the truthfulness of the military accounts but stipulated,
"When conflicting reports come from those we have been taught to consider the leading and best citizens of that country, a predicament is found
that all must recognize as embarrassing to the paper."25 The El Paso Times
admitted a previous report of the death of over one hundred u.s. soldiers at
the hands of Indians was "exaggerated":
The military telegraph line is divided into three sections. This cuts us
off from direct telegraph communication ... and we have to content
ourselves with the rumors from the Western Union regarding the
Indian troubles. It seems that, like all reports of massacres, this last one
has been much exaggerated. Runners from the scene of rapine,
bloodshed and destruction, generally imitate Falstaffs [sic] men in
buckroom [sic], and quadruple the number of casualties. 26
Its manpower stretched to the limit in the West, the army especially distrusted and scrutinized information from the frontier. Shortly after running
the defensive editorial on 31 August 1880, the San Antonio Express received
an anonymous letter from Fort Quitman, Texas, presumably from a ranking
military officer, cautioning the paper to "distrust the authenticity of any
report of Indian operations coming from anyone not actually engaged in
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the campaign."27 In addition, the writer stated that only actual participants
were "competent to speak on the subject, [as] there has been one continual
tirade of misrepresentation and detraction from the very men whose property and lives benefit from the number of troopS."28 The army's telegraph
system, however, remained open to any citizen or party willing to pay for
the service; private messages accounted for the bulk ofwire traffic and helped
the army defray the cost of the system's upkeep.29
Military officials were aware that public cries for increased federal presence against Indians were likely coupled with ulterior motives. Maj. Gen.
Philip H. Sheridan addressed such hidden agendas in a letter to the adjutant general in Washington, D.C., on 10 December 1881. Sheridan explained
why he opposed the San Felipe Agricultural and Manufacturing Company's
intention to donate nearly 408 acres of land in San Felipe, Texas, to the
United States government:
Both San Felipe and Fort Duncan are merely commercial points; they
have no military bearing, and it has always appeared to me as though
the effort to secure the building of a military post at San Felipe had no
other object than to increase the advantages of a private corporation. I
am therefore opposed to the acceptance by the government of any
land for such a purpose. People do not generally give land to the
government without having some private interest to advance. 3o
The War Department commonly signed lucrative contracts with private
citizens to supply cattle, feed-grain, flour, and other goods to the military
forts and outposts that protected the frontier. Many southwest Texans believed that more federal troops and permanent frontier posts would bring
larger contracts to local ranchers, farmers, and merchants. 3l Lucrative beef
contracts benefited cattlemen particularly along the upper reaches of the
Rio Grande, as the price in Texas rose steadily from 5.67 cents per pound in
1876 to 8-47 in 1883.32 Because of the region's extreme aridity, they traditionally supplied beef cattle to the military at prices considerably higher than
the state's average. 33
Despite the army's awareness of such opportunism, newspapers showed
little concern for authenticity or misrepresentation. Local business formed
the core of advertising support for most frontier newspapers throughout the
West. 34 Newspapers continued to print barely credible citizen accounts; one
newspaper even claimed that "collision between the U.S. troops and the
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red devils is a daily occurrence, on the line of New Mexico, [and] every
prisoner taken by the Indians is tied [to a] stake and burned. This practice is
even carried on during the progress of the battle."35 The army would hardly
concur.
By 1881 it became increasingly clear that cattle and farming interests were
not the only commercial parties that stood to gain from such alarming news
along the Texas frontier. Newspapers both inside and outside Texas carried
stories on El Paso's rapid railroad construction and real estate boom, noting
that considerable amounts of land were changing hands up and down the
Rio Grande Valley in the process. 36 As early as 1877 the New York Times
carried news stories announcing potential government subsidies for the Texas
and Pacific Railroad Company, which intended to build a line from San
Antonio to El Paso and eventually to California's Cajon Pass. 37 By 1880 three
more railroad companies - the Southern Pacific, its subsidiary the Galveston,
Harrisburg and San Antonio, and the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fewere actively building toward El Paso. Civic leaders and townspeople alike
stood to gain from this potential influx of capital to the region. 38 Many west
Texas residents believed increased federal military support meant even faster
commercial development and a subsequent infusion oflarge sums of money
into the frontier region. These perceptions were further substantiated in
June 1881 when the El Paso Times reported that the Southern Pacific; the
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe; and the Mexican Central Railroad companies planned on spending $150,000; $200,000; and $50,000, respectively, on
various railroad facilities throughout the town. 39 El Paso and its newspaper,
like previous frontier towns, typically followed the pattern of railroad expansion and the subsequent rise in the homesteader population. 40
In the 1880s the threat ofIndian raids, or at least the perception that they
existed, took on a dual meaning. In one respect the Indian threat continued
to justify the call for additional federal aid, primarily of an increased number of troops. On the other hand, the continued cry for federal assistance
might lead potential investors to believe this frontier region was ill-suited
for investment. Despite this conflict, many Texans' expectations were understandably heightened when Lt. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman visited the burgeoning town and stated that he "believed [it] would become a
very large city, commanding the trade of Mexico as far as her capital," comparing it with "San Francisco thirty years ago."4l
In many Texans' eyes, however, General Sherman's words would not
become a reality until Indians, alive or dead, were removed from the re-
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gion. Late in 1881 bad news poured into and out of newspaper offices, claiming Texas volunteers were needed to protect against Indians on the Rio
Grande and New Mexico frontiers. Headlines like "Indian Deviltry" were
followed by reports about killed or stolen livestock and scouting parties in
pursuit of "red devils." Still other newspapers, as far from the border region
as the state capital, ran headlines telling of "Indian Raids" and individuals
"Scalped By Indians."42
By 1882, official military reports stated that Indian raids continued to decline, but newspapers kept up their agitating attacks. Stories reporting troublesome Indians near Laredo, EI Paso, Fort Stockton, and other Texas locales
were preceded by such alarming headlines as "An Indian Scare," "Indian
Depredations Again-Fear Of A Raid," "More Troops-Depredating Savages," and "Indians After The Rangers."43 One of the stories claimed that a
member of a local squad who had been sent out to chase Indians "swore
that he could see the Indians were at least seven feet high and terrible looking."44 In this circumstance there is little doubt that editors employed hyperbole not only to increase the number of federal troops, but to increase
their newspapers' circulations as well. "Tall tales" of fearsome or beastlike
Indians did much to pique the public's interest as well as their disdain for
Native peoples. 45 Whatever their motives, some Texas newspapers showed
no signs of taming their intemperate rhetoric despite the commonly held
view among army officials that depredations were indeed on the decline.
Sensitive to citizens' concerns, the House Committee on Military Affairs
began investigating Indian affairs in the Department of Texas in late November 1877. Federal officials received conflicting reports, some suggesting
that checking Indian depredations was no longer the army's primary mission along the Rio Grande and West Texas frontiers. 46 For example, F. C.
Godfrey, U.S. Indian Agent to the Mescalero Apache Reservation in New
Mexico Territory, testified that on two separate occasions Texans raided Indian camps within the reservation and stole a total of twenty-six horses and
cattle. Godfrey's testimony continued: "A party of Texans, under the pretext
of searching for horses stolen from them by the Indians, were shown by my
direction through the Indian camps, but they were unable to find any of
their horses. The next night they surrounded the weakest camp, fired on the
Indians, fortunately without effect, and drove off all the horses they could
collect."47
While the Committee on Military Affairs convened in Washington, Texas
newspapers, trumpeting the frontier settlers' cause, declared, "Indians [were]
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on another of their thieving expeditions down the Frio Canon," and "It is
thought that the [Indian] band will strike for the country in the vicinity of
Fredericksburg, Kerrville, and Bandera, and that citizens ofthe section must
look OUt."48 Agent Godfrey refuted shrill claims like these by noting confidently, "The complaints of depredations said to be committed by the Indians have almost ceased, and I hope to be able to chronicle a year without
any complaints at all."49 Godfrey claimed that many reports of Indian raids
along the frontier were false. Upon further investigation, the perpetrators
proved to be "white savages" or outlaws living in the region. 50 Strangely, the
San Antonio Express later corroborated his claim, admitting that raiding bands
composed principally of Mexicans were all being classified as "lndians."5!
This admission did little to change how Texas citizens viewed Indians or
the propensity of newspapers to publish inflammatory stories regarding Indian depredations. John H. Evans, secretary of the International Railroad
Company and former Texas state legislator, sharply rebuked the federal government for ignoring the frontier problem in a letter to Brig. Gen. Edward
O. C. Ord, commander of the Department of Texas: "As one who fought for
the integrity of his country, permit me to say that the utter failure of the
United States to protect the people of Texas between the Nueces and the Rio
Grande Rivers [sic], for many years, constitutes a most shameful passage in
our history."5z Bowing to frontier public sentiment, which called for more
troops, and to a powerful contingent of Texas Democrats in the U.S. House
of Representatives, which threatened to vote against a pending army appropriation bill, army officials moved more cavalry to Texas two months later. 53
There is little doubt Indian depredations were potentially devastating to
people living on the frontier scattered across southwest Texas. The loss of
one or two settlers in a single military outpost's district could be staggering
to small isolated communities. Nevertheless, while private citizens and public
officials alike clamored for increased military assistance in Texas, official
government reports and statistics concluded that Indian depredations were
on the decline. Reports from the Department of War, generally sympathetic
to Texas citizens, and records from the previous decade support this conclusion. From 1866 to 1875 it was reported that Indians were responsible for the
deaths of 120 people in Texas. The years 1873 to 1875 saw the highest number of people killed, totaling forty-five, though this number is not surprising
as the Red River War was fought during those years. 54 Further, from August
1874 to August 1875, the secretary of war reported that nine people were killed
throughout the state, with four of the deaths caused by Indians. 55 The De-

SPRING 2004

KARR

-+

199

partment of Texas maintained that, from 30 September 1876 to 1 October
1877, the department suffered eleven deaths at the hands of Indians. The
report did specify, however, that the army could not attribute all the deaths
specifically to Indians. 56 Agent Godfrey of the Mescalero Apache Reservation noted, "There are several letters on file in this office from the largest
stock-owners in [New Mexico] stating that these Indians have never been as
peaceable as they are at present."57 Still, newspapers declared that Texans
could not escape Indians' hostilities: "The citizens [continually] give battle,
and the red skins flee to their mountain homes."58
The year 1878 proved to be more difficult for Texas authorities. From 1
October 1877 to 2 October 1878, military officials and post commanders
reported that forty-six deaths occurred throughout the Texas Department.
Of the thirty-seven deaths post commanders reported, Indians were specifically noted to be responsible for thirty-two. Unknown assailants killed the
remaining number. In spite of these seemingly alarming numbers, the secretary of war noted in his annual report that Indian incursions from Mexico
were fewer than in recent years and "almost perfect quiet [had] prevailed"
along the Mexican border during the past four months. He attributed this
lull primarily to the increase of U.S. forces in the Rio Grande vicinity as
well as a considerable Mexican force operating against Indians in the same
region. 59 Although Indians from Mexico were reportedly responsible for only
two of the reported civilian deaths, ill feelings toward Mexicans, thought to
incite Indian raids, still flourished throughout Texas. 60 Despite knowledge
of these statistics and the fact that Indians from the Fort Stanton Reservation in New Mexico Territory killed six times as many people, newspapers
still published their strong rhetoric: "The warning has been a timely one....
Until the Indian shall have been weaned from the scalping knife and the
rifle, we need not flatter ourselves that we can master the turbulent Mexican."6! This kind of editorializing against Indians and Mexicans was a tradition that predated the Civil War and remained a part of the frontier psyche. 62
Sensitive to such accusations in the American press, the Mexican government considered its people the primary victims of hostile Indian forays
that originated from Indian reservations in New Mexico and Arizona. Mexican officials responded to the war of words:
The Indians are the marauders whom the [American] press, unfriendly
to this country, are making such an outcry against, [but] not as
exaggerated or expressed by the Texans, who are the ones that
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complain, it is nevertheless also true that in Mexico they burn the
pastures and destroy the cornfields, rob and murder wherever they go,
and afterwards take refuge on American territory.63
In a similar letter written to Gen. Edward Hatch of the United States Army
at Franklin, Texas, Ramon Ortiz, an influential Mexican citizen and longtime resident of El Paso del Norte, complained about the cross-border Indian depredations:
The stock-raising, with its very bad results, under the direction of
[American] Indian agents who have done nothing more than to arm
the Indians and provide them with ammunition almost the same as the
troops and send them out on both frontiers under the plausible pretext
of giving them permission to hunt-this occupation has disappeared
on both banks [of the Rio Grande] on account of the rapacity of the
agents and the savages. 64
The Mexican government soon filed more complaints concerning Indian raids in Mexico. The Foreign Office in Mexico City summoned U.S.
Ambassador John Foster to inform him of the rising tide of Indians crossing
the border from Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas into Mexico. The Mexican foreign minister reported one incident in which sixty Indians, "originat. ing in the vicinity of Fort Clark, Texas," crossed the Rio Grande and "were
engaged in committing depredations in Mexico."65 He made further reference to the "dismay created in Mexico by the circumstances of these Indians crossing the river so near to an American fort, [this occurring] without
the knowledge or opposition of the garrison."66 The Mexican minister lodged
an earlier complaint claiming that Mexican troops reported bands of Indians roaming in Arizona and pillaging indiscriminately in Sonora. 67 Although
Foster denied the incident he still recommended that the War Department
be made aware of the report. 68 The Mexican Foreign Ministry believed,
however, that U.S. officials commonly denied accurate Mexican reports
concerning Indian raids and cattle thefts and falsified those made by their
own citizens. From San Antonio, Mexican Consulate representative Dr.
Plutarco Ornelas noted such creative reporting to the Foreign Ministry in
Mexico City:
From what I could learn, there is a large number of secret agents on
the Mexican border whose exclusive mission is to inform the American
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authorities of any matters concerning frontier relations. [The agents]
do not limit themselves to refer to what is certain about these matters,
but also that which they can invent."69
Based upon his personal dealings with Ord, Ornelas also questioned the
reliability of reports made by the American press and those made specifically by the general in San Antonio:
General Ord led me to understand that the situation [on the border] is
more delicate than it appears.... While he was away in Washington
the press [here] c<:instantly announces that his trip occurred with affairs
relative to border difficulties. General Ord repeated that although he
apparently has certain reservations with reporters, he has himself
depicted the circumstances regarding depredations with exaggerated
truth if not falsely'?o
From 30 September 1878 to 1 October 1879, U.S. Army officers commanding patrols along the Texas frontier related "remarkable results" to their
commanders: Post commanders throughout Texas noted that sixteen people
were killed. Of the sixteen victims, Indians allegedly killed eight. Often
military officials could not substantiate Indian depredations, and significant
numbers of Indians were rarely encountered. In his report to the secretary
of war, General Ord stated that "with a view of making safe the mail-route
and settlements in this vicinity, by forcing the Indians from that region and
keeping them out of it, the intended result has been accomplished."71 Some
patrols determined, however, that Indians were still attacking ranchos and
settlements on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande. United States troops
who did encounter raiding Indians generally pursued them and found that
they came from reservations in New Mexico Territory.72 Nevertheless, many
Texans continued to pay little heed to government statistics or the testimonies
of their neighbors south of the Rio Grande. In an impassioned speech given
before the Texas State Legislature in March 1879, State Representative John
Salmon Ford called the Indian raids an "invasion" supported by facts:

It is not presumable any Senator will arise in his place, and seriously
make the declaration that the United States has protected the State of
Texas against invasion, and her citizens in the enjoyment of their
rights. Such an allegation would be met and refuted by a formidable
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array of facts, many of which have become history, by recent events
and by events now transpiring on our extended, exposed, and suffering
frontier. ... Is it within the range of probability that the Indians will
abandon the war-path, that they will desist making hostile incursions
into Texas; and all at once assume the guise and the habits of peace
and civilization? ... In a state subject to hostile incursions from a
neighboring power by armed bands of lawless men, who murder
citizens, rob, plunder-burn houses-and [sic] even break jails and
release convicts and criminals; in a state subject to incursions by
Indians, to the commission of all revolting deeds of cruelty and
violence incident to savage warfare; ... How can the members of that
state escape from the baneful effects of the demoralization certain to
ensue from such outrages, such infractions of rights?7)

In reality, the number of people Indians allegedly killed from 1879 to
1880 totaled nine. Nevertheless, in response to further public outcry, Comr.
Ind. Affs. Hiram Price, referring to Indians in New Mexico and Arizona,
recommended that all Indians, either living on or off reservations, be removed to more northerly regions in those territories. He espeically recommended the Mescaleros for relocation, noting that "the citizens of New
Mexico and Texas have urged this, and the military authorities have regarded such a movement as indispensable to the protection of the citizens."74
Price implied, however, that Mescaleros were unjustly blamed for the area's
lawlessness. He claimed that Lincoln County, New Mexico, in which the
"reservation is situated, has for a population the very worst elements that
can be found in the Territory or Mexico - Spanish and Mexican refugees
from justice, [and] outlaws from the States."75 Col. Benjamin H. Grierson,
commander of the Pecos District, Fort Concho, Texas, loosely corroborated
Price's statement: "The Indians are not the only thieves who infest the country; there are many other persons in the vicinity of the Indian reservation
who make a business of stealing stock alike from citizens and the Indians.''76
Grierson did point out, however, that, if Indians were raiding in parts of
New Mexico, "trails, [when] followed by the troops, were found to lead in
the direction of the Mescalero Agency."Tt
The Indian Bureau was aware that a sizeable contingent of repined
Mescaleros had joined Victorio's Mimbres band, which, at the time these
reports were written, was then raiding throughout southwestern New
Mexico. 78 Yet open warfare waged by these and other bands was a concern
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throughout much of the southwestern frontier for several years. In addition
to Texas, hostilities erupted in both New Mexico and Arizona in 1877, stemming from the San Carlos reservation. Warm Springs, Chiricahua, and
Mescalero Apaches under Victorio's able leadership and a rugged international border proved to be formidable opponents against U.S. and Mexican
troops. Even after Victorio's death in 1880 southwestern turmoil did not
end. Troubles originating again at the San Carlos Apache reservation brought
the defeat of Col. Eugene A. Carr's troops at Cibicue Creek, leading to
more Indian raids in southern New Mexico and northern Chihuahua. These
events in turn sparked additional Chiricahua hostilities, which did not cease
to threaten New Mexico and Arizona until Geronimo's surrender to Gen.
Nelson A. Miles in 1886. 79
The "Indian problem" in the Texas Department, however, had all but
disappeared by 1881. With nearly four-thousand army personnel stationed
in the department, Texas citizens could no longer claim that the federal
government ignored them, nor could they claim that they were under constant threat of attack from "savage" Indians. The new commander of the
Department of Texas, Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur, reported to the adjutant general, Military Division of the Missouri, in late 1881: "I am happy to report
that, generally, this exemption from frontier troubles has prevailed up to
this time. There was no trouble of any kind on either frontier of the department."80 Augur did mention that small parties of Indians had inflicted raids
on the Fort Davis area. While some believed these Indians were from Mexico,
Augur considered it more likely that they were from some of the reservations in New Mexico. 8! Indeed, the Mescalero Apache Reservation, closest
among the New Mexico tribes in proximity to the Texas border, was populated by nine hundred Indians in 1881 and 1882. 82 With the near completion
of several railroad lines throughout the upper reaches of Rio Grande Valley,
Augur believed that military posts would no longer be needed south of the
Texas and Pacific Railway line, which at that time ran as far west as San
Martin Spring, approximately fifty miles north of Fort Davis. In light of
these frontier conditions he concluded that Indian raids would cease to be a
problem in the area.
Forts Concho, McKavett, and Stockton are thus rendered unnecessary;
Fort Griffin, no longer necessary, was abandoned as a military post in
May last [1881]. If barracks are to be built at San Antonio for a regiment,
to be in readiness at that post for an emergency at any point on either
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frontier [Northwest and Rio Grande], then Fort Clark can also be given
up. It is not probable that Indian depredations will ever again be made
from any point in Mexico, south of the mouth of the Pecos. 83
Augur's conclusions were based indirectly upon the passage of two separate bills by the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate in 1880. The bills
provided appropriations in the amount of two hundred thousand dollars for
the purpose of acquiring and erecting new military posts "on or near the
Rio Grande frontier" for the protection of "constantly endangered and long
suffering citizen frontier people."84 In 1882, and in light of the tranquility
along this frontier, Secretary of War Robert T. Lincoln suggested altering
the wording within the appropriations act.
I beg to invite attention to the endorsement of the General of the
Army, dated the 19th instant, in which it is recommended that the act
of April 16, 1880, be so amended as to authorize money ($200,000)
appropria,ted thereby to be expended in Texas, but not necessarily on
or near the Rio Grande.... The views therein embodied are in
consonance with those entertained by the local military authorities,
and, concurring therein, I would recommend that the same act be
amended by striking out the words "on or near the Rio Grande
frontier, as may be deemed necessary by the Secretary of War for the
adequate protection thereof," and inserting in lieu thereof the words
"in the State of Texas, as may be deemed necessary by the Secretary of
War for the adequate protection of the Rio Grande frontier."85
While the army remained cautious regarding the unsettled condition of
certain Indian tribes and reported depredations, it was less willing to accommodate the habitually false reports of Indian depredations printed in
Texas newspapers by 1882. 86 Confident that attacks by Indians and marauding thieves were on the decline, the government appropriated funds for
only one new frontier post at Fort Hancock, north of Fort Quitman along
the Rio Grande. The bulk of the remaining sum went instead toward the
expansion of the military garrison in San Antonio, which was determined to
be the best location for troops should they be needed to respond to any
frontier problems. 87
Mter Reconstruction, many Texans looked west across the vast landscape
hoping to gain economic prosperity in the state's untamed frontier. Native

SPRING 2004

KARR

-+ 205

Americans, many living along the state's Rio Grande and Trans-Pecos frontiers during these years, found themselves directly in the path of American
expansion. Texas citizens, fearful that Indians would ravage their families,
homesteads, and cattle herds, called on the federal government to lend support in exterminating these "savages," many of whom, it was believed, raided
across the international border with Mexico's prescience if not deliberate
assistance.
Although by the mid-1870S U.S. military and Indian agency officials widely
accepted that Native Americans posed no serious threat to Texas's Rio Grande
frontier or to much of southwest Texas, private citizens eager to acquire
government contracts for cattle, grain, and other merchandise insisted that
more federal troops be sent to protect against "hostile" Indians. Moreover,
as railroads pushed farther west through the upper Rio Grande Valley, commercial and real estate interests as well as Texas newspapers bellowed the
same call for assistance.
There is little evidence to support the claims of some Texas newspapers
that a significant Indian threat existed through the early 1880s. 88 Upon investigation, most reports of Indian attacks on the frontier during this period have
proved false. By late October 1882, General Augur declared the department
had not reported a single Indian with hostile intent during that past year. 89
Indian depredations were clearly a part of both the lives and the lore of
many who lived along large portions of the southwestern frontier. Whites
fought to maintain what they understood as a civilized culture, one that
viewed American Indians much as it did the wild animals that roamed the
desert. Conversely, Indians understood little of White traditions and social
standards. Ultimately, Indians were forced to alter their lifestyles.
In comparison to the previous decade, Indian depredations were in significant decline by the mid-1870S. By the 1880s, as reports clearly indicate,
Indians were themselves n~ longer a significant part of the Texas population. Commercial concerns may have been the primary impetus for this
outcome; newspapers and business opportunists frequently made strong allies on the frontier as well as in cities. Without outside markets for their beef
and grain, Texas ranchers and farmers could not expect to sell their surplus
goods. By the 1880s railroad expansion began to spread across the Southwest, moving new goods and services to areas that only a short time before
were largely beyond the sphere of national and international commerce.
Many American Indians, forced from their traditional lands and lives, could
expect few concessions from an adversarial and openly hostile culture. Even
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Native resistance became a source of rhetorical distortion and imperial advance. Both economic factors and racism motivated frontier people during
this and other eras in American history.
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